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THE DECREASING ONTOLOGICAL DENSITY OF THE STATE
IN CATHOLIC SOCIAL DOCTRINE
Patrick McKinley Brennan1

“There are a hundred reasons for opposition to the natural law,
but this is one of them and at certain times it may be the strongest:
obligation in natural law does not hold unless the natural law exists
in a state which is actually prior, but which is ultimate in the order of
discovery – ‘this law is an aspect of God.’”

--Yves R. Simon2
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INTRODUCTION

“Dignitatis humane personae hac nostra aetate:” With these words the fathers of
the Second Vatican Council (1962-65) began the “Declaration on Religious Liberty,”
Dignitatis Humanae (1965): “In our day men are becoming increasingly conscious of the
dignity of the human person.” More than four decades have passed since the Council
made this claim on behalf of a dawning awareness of human dignity. Today, dignity is
the familiar fountainhead of post-conciliar Catholic social doctrine. Not only the other
conciliar documents, but then the teaching documents of Pope John Paul II, the
Catechism of the Catholic Church, and the recent Compendium of the Social Doctrine of
the Church alike make the dignity of the human person a primary point of departure for
practical reflection on man’s life in this world and beyond. In the words of the
Compendium: “The Book of Genesis provides us with certain foundations of Christian
anthropology: the inalienable dignity of the human person, the roots and guarantee of
which are found in God’s design of creation . . . .”3

Less familiar than the train of thought I have just telescoped is one currently
under construction by the United States Supreme Court, according to which the fifty
states of the union are each possessed of “sovereign dignity.” In a rambunctious series of
cases decided over the last decade, the Court has propounded and given effect to the view
that the states “retain the dignity, though not the full authority, of sovereignty.”4 In sum,
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it is the judgment of the Supreme Court that states are immune to unconsented private
suit thanks to their “sovereignty” and “sovereign dignity.”5

Some students of the Court have discounted the Court’s jurisprudence of
“sovereign dignity” and other (as one commentator has dubbed them) “big ideas” on the
ground that they are mere “rhetorical flourish.”6 This is an ominous course of action
when one pauses to notice that the coercive effect given the Court’s rhetoric leads to the
denial of an otherwise required legal remedy to injured plaintiffs. Different language
would justify or call for a different course, perhaps one closer to a correspondence
between legal right and legal remedy.

The denial of an otherwise enforceable remedy is not, however, the leading reason
for not blinking the Court’s claims on behalf of sovereign states: These ideas make
progress in men’s minds. As Russell Hittinger has observed, “If we ask a modern person
who or what is sovereign, he or she would not say ‘reason,’ ‘the individual,’ or ‘science,’
but instead, without hesitation, ‘the state.’”7 The Court’s recent sovereignty and
sovereign dignity jurisprudence may, as I have argued elsewhere8, make hash of the
inherited understandings of Article III of the Constitution, of the Eleventh Amendment
thereto, and of the common law privilege by which the king was immune to suit. At the
same time, however, the Court’s ontologically baroque jurisprudence plays right into the
5
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modern mind described by Hittinger. The irony is thick. The state that by its own
oracular confession is axiologically incompetent to pass on questions of the good, turns
out to be free to declare itself sovereign -- and no one arches an eyebrow.9 The fact that
friends and less friendly critics tell me that the Supreme Court’s essays in the sovereignty
and sovereign dignity of the United States and of the fifty states are in service of the
noble goal of “our federalism” just tends to demonstrate that people are strangely
comfortable with the idea that the state is, in fact, possessed of sovereignty and is,
therefore(?), the preeminent locus of dignity.10

Of course, whether the proposition that the state is sovereign and possessed of
“sovereign dignity” should be judged correct depends on what one means by “sovereign,”
and it is by no means a univocal term. There was a time when the Church, united with
the state, blessed the idea that the state was a sacrum, a unity of order possessed of the
dignity of a group person in the image of God the sovereign ruler of the universe. In the
judgment of modern Catholic social doctrine, however, it is clear, and increasingly so,
that the state is not “sovereign” in any ordinary meaning of the term. Indeed, over the
course of the last century-plus, the Church gradually converged on the judgment that the
state is a servant-instrument of persons and of the societies in which they reach whatever
perfection of which they are capable. Though the state enjoys a certain dignity from its
end (the service of the common good of the body politic), the trend has been “a steady
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deterioration of any ontological density to the state.”11 The state has to “achieve its true
dignity,”12 and this it would do by implementing the natural law, for the common good.

Until shortly ago, it would have been largely uncontroversial to observe that the
state, though less ontologically thick than it used to be, achieves its end by serving to
implement the natural law, as life’s contingencies require or allow.13 The rub comes,
though, when the state deems itself not bound by the natural law, that is, when the state
becomes absolute, ab-solutus, un-bound -- the boast of the modern sovereign lionized by
Thomas Hobbes and his ideological descendants, and conjured by the Supreme Court in
its incantations of sovereignty.14 The Church laicized the state on the understanding that
the state would of course continue to be bound by the natural law. The rub under which
we live is a state that considers itself free, indeed somehow obligated, to disregard the
natural law.15

Until recently, one could count on the the magisterium of the Church to inveigh
against states that proceed in derogation from the natural law. Today, however, Pope
Benedict has grown notably taciturn on the state’s relationship to the natural law. By not
affirming that the state is possessed of access to – and is bound by -- the natural law, by
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not teaching that the state makes positive law by legislating in accordance with or giving
determination/specification to the natural law, Pope Benedict has allowed a question
about the legal basis of the state’s authority to make law.

There will be much more to say about this, but first nota bene: This paper does
not make the patently false claim that Benedict commends or acknowledges a state
founded, as it were, on relativism. Pope Benedict XVI’s teaching on society and state are
conspicuous for their insistence that we, no matter who we are, must take our social
bearings from objective reason.16 Rather, my claim is that in the writings Cardinal
Ratzinger and now Pope Benedict, the state appears no longer to be part of the divine,
legal governance. As Benedict describes the state, it undertakes to make law and does
indeed produce something that we refer to as “law,” but it does so without first having
received (the natural) law. My question is this: How a state that has no access to law can
proceed to make law, without being itself lawless?

In Part I, I outline the understanding of law, state, and society advanced in the
2005 encyclical letter Deus caritas est, Pope Benedict’s first major teaching document.
Parts II and III chronicle the proximate background against which Benedict was writing,
calling attention to ways in which Deus caritas seeks to amend or emend relevant facets
of the tradition descending from Pope Leo XIII’s 1891 encyclical Rerum novarum to
John Paul II’s celebration of its centenary in the 1991 encyclical Centesimus annus. Part
IV provides a summary statement of the classical twentieth-century Catholic statement on
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man, state, and society, relying principally on the work of Jacques Maritain (1882-1973).
On that account, the instrumentalist state, no longer ontologically baroque, is the servant
of men and women who implement the natural law through pluriform societies, including
political society served by the state. The burden of the final two sections is to show
several ways in which Cardinal Ratzinger and Pope Benedict deviate from the classical
instrumentalist state articulated by Maritain and others, and deliver in its stead a state
whose positive “laws” lack divine legal warrant.

I. A first statement of the social order according to “Deus caritas est”

The encyclical Deus caritas comes to consider the state of the state by way of
meeting the Marxist’s old objection to the Church’s historical performance of and
encouragement of works of charity.17 In an encyclical conceived to encourage ecclesial
and individual Christians’ acts of charity, the Pope concedes that there is “some truth” to
the objection that the proliferation of acts of charity can tend to preserve a status quo of
dependency and injustice. The Pope’s first characterization of the end of the state occurs
in this context, and is as follows: “It is true that the pursuit of justice must be a
fundamental norm of the state and that the aim (finis) of a just social order is to guarantee
to each person, according to the principle of subsidiarity (principio subsidiarietatis), his
share of the community’s goods.”18 In adding a layer to the inherited body of social
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doctrine, Benedict thus begins by teaching that the end of what we call in English the
state, for which Benedict’s Latin is civitas, is the creation of a just social order. The state
is not an end in itself. “Politics,” the Pope continues, has as “its fundamental task
(munus) the just ordering of society and the state.” The Pope goes on immediately to
quote Augustine’s aphorism according to which a civitas “not governed according to
justice would be just a bunch of thieves.” Benedict elaborates:

Justice is both the aim (finis) and the intrinsic criterion of all politics.
Politics is more than a simple, technical art for defining the rules of public
life: its origin and goal are found in justice, which by its very nature has to
do with ethics. So the state cannot avoid the question: how is justice to be
achieved here and now? But this question presupposes an even more
radical one: What is justice? This is a question of practical reason, but, if
reason is to be exercised properly, it must undergo constant purification.19

Here, Benedict continues, “politics and faith meet.” According to the Pope,
“Faith,” “an encounter with the living God,” “liberates reason from its blind spots” and
thus helps it “to see its proper object more clearly.” “This is where Catholic social
doctrine has its place,” the Pope explains. It does not “give the Church power over the
state,” let alone “impose on those who do not share the faith ways of thinking and modes
of conduct proper to faith.” In sum: “Its aim is simply to help purify reason and to
contribute, here and now, to the acknowledgment and attainment of what is just.”20 Lest
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there be any ambiguity about basis of the teaching: “The Church’s social doctrine argues
on the basis of reason and the natural law, that is, on the basis of what is in accord with
the nature of the human person,” “a ratione et a naturali iure, id est ab eo quod congruit
naturae cuiusque personae humanae.”21 We shall have to return to this remarkable
formulation in due course.

Next, continuing to develop his thesis about the insufficiency of justice, both as
motivator and as end, the Pope explains: “There is no civil ordering so just as to
eliminate the need for the service of love.” Benedict continues, further characterizing the
state: “The State which would provide everything, absorbing everything into itself,
would ultimately become a mere bureaucracy incapable of guaranteeing the very thing
the suffering person – every person – needs: namely, loving personal concern.” Finally,
in giving his most concrete indication of what the state can and should be, the Pope
reintroduces, and for the first time in the encyclical gives flesh to the bones of, the
principle of subsidiarity: “We do not need a state which regulates and controls
everything, but a State which, in accordance with the principle of subsidiarity, generously
acknowledges and supports initiatives arising from the different social forces (ex variis
socialibus viribus) and combines spontaneity with closeness to those in need.”22 The
Church herself, the Pope immediately adds, “is one of those living forces.”

In sum: The encyclical teaches that human persons engage in politics in order to
secure justice and also to allow opportunities for charity. The social forces in which

21
22

Id.
Id. at No. 28(b).

9

persons are united, for example in the Church, are to be acknowledged and encouraged.
This is part of the role of the state, and a state that ignored or dissolved those bonds by
substituting itself in their place would violate the principle of subsidiarity. Though
properly ecclesial acts of charity must never be confused for acts of the state, the Pope
concludes, quoting the Catechism of the Catholic Church, that “charity must animate the
entire lives of the lay faithful and therefore also their political activity, lived as ‘social
charity,’” a term of art Benedict receives from Pius XI. Succinctly: “The mission of the
lay faithful is . . . to configure social life correctly” and realize the conditions of the
“‘common good.’” This is “the world of politics,” in which the Church herself has only
an “indirect office,” that of purifying reason and “reawakening . . . those moral forces
without which just structures are neither established nor prove effective in the long
run.”23

II. The Social Order in the Proximate Tradition: Leo XIII

In turning now to ask what Benedict has added to or subtracted from the tradition,
which disputed questions he has resolved and which he has exacerbated, the place to
begin is Pope Leo XIII’s social encyclicals, the first papal contribution to what Pope Pius
XI (r. 1922-39) termed, in his 1931 encyclical Quadragesimo anno, “social . . .
doctrine.”24 Benedict credits Leo with ending the papal magisterium neglect to study
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individuals’ needs in radically changed social circumstances, above all in his landmark
encyclical Rerum novarum. Among that encyclical’s novel and more or less enduring
contributions are an articulation of the rights of workers (e.g., time off, limited hours) and
an affirmation of the validity of workers’ associations, the forerunners of today’s trade
unions. (Oddly from today’s vantage point, Leo reaches novel rights of workers to
associate from an analysis of family society and of the natural right to property). In
affirming workers’ rights to associate themselves, and apart from management, the
encyclical rejected the so-called “corporatist” position that would have sanctioned
exclusively hierarchical associations composed of both management and workers.25 This
was a bold and hard-won development; it was, in a word, modern.

In its assumptions and expressions about the essence of the state itself, however,
Leo’s encyclical is, in its essentials, utterly traditional, which is to say, committed to an
ontologically dense state. Like all subsequent encyclicals that consider the state, Rerum
novarum declines to endorse any particular form(s) of government. “By the State,” Leo
wrote in Rerum novarum, “we here understand, not the particular form of government
prevailing in this or that nation, but the State as rightly apprehended.” The exact form is
not specified; “the State as rightly apprehended is “any government conformable in its
institutions to right reason and natural law, and to those dictates of the divine reason . . .
.”26 More specifically, Leo taught that because God the author of nature “wills that man
Encyclical Teaching From Pius VI-Pius XI (1791-1939) 587 n. 1 (1985) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation,
Catholic University of Leuven) (on file with author).
25
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should live in society,” that is, that it is in man’s nature to associate in (among other
forms) civil society, and further because “a society can neither exist nor be conceived in
which there is no one to govern the wills of individuals,” “God has willed that in civil
society there should be some to rule the multitude.”27 Leo never lets his reader lose sight
of the “the divine origin of all authority.”28 The people designate the ruler; they in no
way confer ruling authority.29 “[N]o man has in himself or of himself the power of
constraining the free will of others by fetters of authority [that calls for obedience]. This
power resides solely (unice) in God, the Creator and Legislator of all things; and it is
necessary that those who exercise it should do so as having received it from God.”30
Leo’s state is ontologically dense because it is nothing short of a participation or
reception of, or participation in, divine ruling power.

Post-Leonine magisterial teachings do not deny that all authority is from God, but
whereas many subsequent magisterial and other Catholic theories argued that such
authority passed from God to civil leaders by way of the people (the so-called
transmission or translation theory, first developed by Jesuits in the sixteenth and
seventeenth centuries), Leo himself stayed far away from this theory.31 No doubt Leo
realized that the theory lends itself to the misunderstanding that ruling power is from
man, not God. On Leo’s account of man, state, and society, all authority emanates from
27
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God alone, and very clearly so. Says Leo, quoting Romans 13:1: “[C]ivil power,
considered as such, is from God, always from God: ‘For there is no power but from
God.’”32

How does God give civil power or ruling authority to man? Leo’s answer to this
question flows from his Thomistic understanding of the natural law. Before I describe
that understanding, it cannot be said emphatically enough that Leo’s concept of the
natural law differs toto caelo from most conceptions of the same that are debated today,
especially the one popularized by John Finnis, Germaine Grisez, and Joseph Boyle, as
well as, to pick another example, the revisionist reading of Aquinas advanced by
Anthony Lisska.33 While I cannot here give anything approaching an adequate
description, let alone defense, of the teaching on natural law that St. Thomas developed
and Leo in due course appropriated, one can, in rather short order, highlight the essentials
that distinguish it from the later declension. What is most conspicuous, for Thomas and
Leo it’s law all the way up and all the way down, as it were. The foundation of Leo’s
account of man, society, and the state, and specifically of the power to make positive law,
is man’s natural law participation in the eternal law. “The theme of law is paramount to
Leo’s understanding of how human persons and their works stand within God’s ordering
wisdom.”34

32
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According to Thomas, to whom Leo turned, the natural law and the eternal law
are not “diverse,” or entirely different, from each other. In question 91, article 2 of the
Summa theologiae, which asks whether there is a natural law (and of course answers in
the affirmative), Thomas replies to one of the objections as follows: “This argument
would hold, if the natural law were something diverse from the eternal law: whereas it is
nothing but a participation thereof.” This formulation recalls the thesis of the preceding
corpus of the article:

Now among all others, the rational creature is subject to Divine
providence in the most excellent way, in so far as it partakes of a share of
providence, by being both provident for itself and for others. Wherefore it
has a share of the Eternal Reason, whereby it has a natural inclination to
its proper act and end: and this participation of the eternal law in the
rational creature is called the natural law. . . .

After further analysis, Thomas concludes: “It is therefore evident that the natural law is
nothing else than the rational creature’s participation of the eternal law.” Consistently,
when considering laws other than the eternal law, such as the divine positive law,
Thomas omits to mention the natural law.35 This is because, on his view, the natural law
is not other than the eternal law. “The natural law is called natural according to the mode
of promulgation and reception, not the pedigree of legislation.”36 The natural law is the

35
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eternal law instilled in us so as to be known naturally.37 God promulgates the natural law
in us, and, having received it, we are to abide by it in our individual and collective living.

Just how the reception of the natural law occurs in the rational person is a
complex question, vigorously disputed among otherwise mutually congenial Thomists.
Some emphasize the rational quality of the knowledge, while others, such as Jacques
Maritain, stress the way in which the knowledge is through inclination or connaturality.
We need not settle or even further clarify the issue for the present purpose. The cardinal
point, from the point of view of the Leonine-Thomistic account of law and the state, is
this:

Every created intelligence not only has a competence to make judgments,
but to make judgments according to a real law – indeed, a law that is the
form and pattern of all other laws. Thus, the legal order of things does not
begin with an acquired virtue, possessed by a few; nor does it begin with
the offices and statutes of human positive law; nor does it begin with the
law revealed at Sinai. God speaks the law, at least in its rudiments, to
every intelligent creature.38

37

Id.
Id. at 98. By way of intellectual autobiography, I should say that while it was Russell Hittinger’s work
on St. Thomas that finally convinced me of this reading of Thomas on law, it was the dissertation of
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in the late 1980s while I was a student there, that first and most comprehensively made the case for me, and
I have relied on it here. See Stephen Louis Brock, The Legal Character of Natural Law According to St.
Thomas Aquinas (1988) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Toronto). See also James P. Reilly,
Jr., “Saint Thomas on Law,” 5-6, 12-17 (The Etienne Gilson Lecture, 1988). Reilly was one of Brock’s
dissertation directors.
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In short, having received a law, man can proceed to make more law, in conformity with
the received law. This is the consequence of the natural law’s being the rational
creature’s participation in the eternal law. 39

Turning from Thomas himself to Leo’s appropriation of the Thomist doctrine for
purposes of articulating a papal theory of man, society, and the state, we find Leo
maintaining that all power of governance derives from God “as from a natural and
necessary principle.”40 This “necessary principle” is the eternal law, of which the natural
law is the human person’s first participation of God’s (sole) governance of the universe.41
On Leo’s model, those whom the people have designated to rule participate, as do all
people, in the eternal law; those designated to rule by law possess authority over political
society, and through law give it the order it should have. “Authority,” Leo explains,

is the one and only foundation of law – the power, that is, of fixing duties
and defining rights, [and so forth]. But all this, clearly, cannot be found in
man, if, as his own supreme legislator, he is to be the [supreme] rule of his
own actions. It follows, therefore, that the law of nature is the same thing
as the eternal law, implanted on rational creatures, and inclining them to

39

Not every human judgment reached in conformity with the natural law is itself a law, however. In
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their right action and end; and can be nothing else but the eternal reason of
God, the Creator and Ruler of the world.42

Leo’s state is ontologically dense, because caught up in and a consequence of the
divine rule of the cosmos. “For Leo, the broad metaphysical and theological scheme
remained that of a divine commonwealth in which the political state had as its principle
and end the imitation (however imperfectly) of God. The state, [Leo] said, is a ‘likeness
and symbol as it were of the Divine majesty.’ By dint of participation in God’s
governance, its ruling powers properly can be called ‘sacred.’”43 According to Leo, “in
civil society, God has always willed that there should be a ruling authority [principatus],
and that they who are invested with it should reflect the divine power and providence in
some measure over the human race.”44 The state is no mere instrument, but a reflection
of the divine sovereignty. All ruling power is ad imaginem Dei.45

The ontological density of Leo’s state comes into further focus as we zero in on
the fact that, for Leo, the Church and the state have the same source of authority and, in
fact, a similar mode of possessing it. Both come directly from God, and if there be
greater latitude in terms of how authority is to be possessed in the state than in the

42
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Church, still “the state was to be the moral mirror of the Church in the secular realm.”46
The Church was the superior society, the societas perfecta, but the state, its moral mirror,
enjoyed the exalted function of assisting the Church in making men moral and getting
them to heaven.

Leo’s paternalistic state, for all its undeniable ontological density, is emphatically
not, however, totalizing or totalitarian. The state is limited. The state -- or we might say,
with precision that is not Leo’s, political society (or the body politic) under civil authority
-- is limited, first of all, by the supernatural society that is the Church.47 Indeed, as a
matter of history, a principal reason for Leo’s concern with the state was to see that the
Church was left freedom and room to fulfill her mission. (In the Leonine prayers that
used to follow Low Mass, the faithful and their clergy prayed for “the freedom of . . .
Holy Mother the Church”).

Also limiting the state, moreover, are the societies that are “rough-hewn48 by
nature” itself, preeminently political society, marriage, and the family.49 Not only these
societies whose forms are given (the Church’s supernaturally, the family’s both naturally
and supernaturally), but also those that humans create, as time and circumstance allow or
demand, based on man’s natural “tendency to dwell in society”50 bound the state. For
example: sodalities and unions and schools, as well as monasteries and religious orders
such as the Carthusians, the Augustinians, the Jesuits. These, too, the state must respect
46
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and not absorb. In sum, the ontological abundance of such smaller societies, each a
participated share in the divine rule, both gives density to civil society under legitimate
authority which, as it were, contains them, and, correlatively, places limits on the
authority that rules civil society, for it recognizes authority that is not the state’s.

Finally, (and this would almost go without saying except that it is exactly what
the modern liberal democracies have forgotten or denied), even within its legitimate
sphere of action, the state is limited by the fact that it cannot obligate or (except on
prudential grounds) permit conduct that would violate the natural (or the divine positive)
law.51 Obviously, this is entailed by all ruling authority’s being man’s natural law
sharing in the divine ruling power, according to which, as Leo says, “[God] disposes all
things sweetly [suaviter], because to all things He gives forms and powers inclining them
to that which He Himself moves them, so that they tend toward it not by force, but as if it
were by their own free accord.”52 The sweeping picture is one of God sweetly leading
rational creatures to their ends through the internal communication of obligation to be
responded to in freedom exercised to implement the content of that obligation.

Not to put the point too sharply, a state whose authorities both can and are
obligated to judge according to a participated share in the divine rule, according to law
imbued in man’s very own nature, does not profess, as the Supreme Court did in Planned
Parenthood v. Casey, a judicially enforceable “right to define one’s own concept of
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existence, of meaning, of the universe, and of the mystery of human life.”53 This is a
principal point to which we must return after assessing Benedict’s encyclical’s capacity
to address it, but first we should lay out more of the structure that Benedict inherited.

III. The Social Order in the Proximate Tradition: From Pius XI to John Paul II

Moving ahead forty years from Leo’s publication of Rerum novarum, to Pope
Pius XI’s celebration, application, and development of the same in Quadragesimo anno,
we reach the high-water mark of the papal effort to create a neo-Thomist synthesis
respecting Church, state, and society. “The most significant and vital topic of
[Quadragesimo anno], was “the re-establishment of a truly Christian social order,”54
which Pius sketches, quoting St. Paul to the Church at Ephesus, in organic terms that are
evocative of Leo:

If the members of the body social [

] are . . . reconstituted, and if the

directing principle of economic social life is restored, it will be possible to
say in a certain sense even of this body what the Apostle says of the
mystical body of Christ: “The whole body (being closely joined and knit
together through every joint of the system according to the functioning in
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due measure of each single part) derives its increase to the building up of
itself in love.”55

As this language makes unmistakably clear, Pius does not eschew the traditional
thesis according to which membership in the hierarchical body of the state constitutes an
ontological perfection of the person. However, Quadragesimo anno does take a large
step toward the “instrumentalist” view of the state that Pius XI’s successor, Pius XII,
would advance in 1939, a month after the invasion of Poland. The principal contribution
of Pius XI to the Catholic understanding of man, society, and the state was to affirm and
emphasize a social order rich in diverse societies or associations that, as for Leo, limit the
state. Pius affirms the following limits on the emergent modern state:

When we speak of the reform of institutions, the State [ ] comes chiefly to
mind, not as if universal well-being were to be expected of its activity, but
because things have come to such a pass through the evil of what we have
termed “individualism” that, following upon the overthrow and near
extinction of that rich social life that was once highly developed through
associations of various kinds, there remain virtually only individuals and
the State. This is to the great harm of the State itself; for, with a structure
of social governance lost, and the taking over of all the burdens which the
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wrecked associations once bore, the State has been overwhelmed and
crushed by almost infinite tasks and duties.56

In the next paragraph of the encyclical, after conceding that changed circumstances
indicate that what was once done by small associations may indeed have to be performed
by larger associations, Pius announces “that most weighty principle, which cannot be set
aside or changed, [and which] remains fixed and unshaken in social philosophy:”

Just as it is gravely wrong to take from individuals what they can
accomplish by their own initiative and industry and give it to the
community [ ], so also is it an injustice and at the same time a grave evil
and disturbance of right order to assign to a greater and higher association
what lesser and subordinate organizations can do. For every social
activity ought of its very nature nature to furnish help to the members of
the body social, and never destroy and absorb them.57

This, of course, is the classic formulation of what is known as the principle of
subsidiarity, to which Pius gives additional expression in the succeeding paragraph:

[T]hose in power should be sure that the more perfectly a graduated order
is kept among the various associations, in observance of the principle of
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“subsidiary function,” the stronger social authority and effectiveness will
be the happier and more prosperous the condition of the State.58

What Pius describes as a fixed and unshaken principle of social philosophy had
never been mentioned by name, let alone defined, in a prior encyclical, nor would St.
Thomas, whose philosophy guided Leo XIII and Pius XI, have quite recognized it,
though one can regard it as a legitimate development of inherited Thomistic principles, in
response to modern social problems. Pius received the principle of “subsidiary function”
or, as it came to be called, subsidiarity, from the work of the Italian Jesuit Thomist Luigi
Taparelli, whose self-appointed task it was, in the context of the mid-nineteenth century
unification in Italy, to oppose, based true on Thomistic principles, not only the overtly
dangerous doctrines of Hobbes, Locke, and Rousseau, but also those of such slippery
thinkers as Burlamaqui, Pufendorf, and Grotius.59

Taparelli’s original work is thick with neologisms, including the Italian phrase,
dritto ipotattico, the second word of which corresponds to the Greek hypotaxis, which
refers to the modalities of coordination among the clauses of a sentence. Etymologically,
it means “to sit under,” and of this the Latin equivalent is sub sedeo, from which the
Latin substantive is subsidiarium. As one scholar explains,

The Latin expression subsidia [the plural of subsidium] applied, then, not
just to mean “help” but in the first instance to auxiliary troops with the
58
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Roman legion, as they “sat below” ready in reserve to support the battle.
The “help” in this context is from the bottom up, not from the top down,
as the inferior and mediating groups all participate in achieving the
common good of the more perfect association.60

Rather than, as is often supposed, a principle of devolution or lowest level function, in
magisterial Catholic social doctrine, subsidiarity is a principle of respect, ordering,
coordination, and, as necessary, help, among plural societies, viz., the supernatural
society that is the Church, those that come “rough-hewn” by nature, and that those that
men create through intelligence and will, for good purposes. The principle of subsidiarity
both limits the powers of those possessed of civil authority and recognizes their given
functions.

The social landscape that is the focus of Quadragesimo anno can be described as
one of pluralism. Pius certainly did not imagine for a moment that legitimate authorities
could be set up and give effect to what violates the natural or divine law; there exist no
pockets of blessed derogation from man’s natural law participation in the eternal law.
There exist, however, plural societies, each of which, if functioning half decently, is
possessed of its own genuine authority, through its participated governing share in the
eternal law. The authority of the parent in and over the family, the authority of the
bishop in and over the particular church, the authority of the president in and over the
sodality, the authority of the abbot in and over the abbey and its monks – these are plural
authorities that, though subject to apt regulation by the state with a view to the common
60
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good of all (individuals and their respective societies), precede the state, with which they
stand on the same ontological footing that is the natural law participation in the eternal
law.

What, then, can be said of the state specifically? Some commentators have
concluded that, in celebrating this plural social order, Pius XI reached the view that the
state is (simply) an instrument of said societies.61 Although Pius moves in this direction,
the thesis of organicity and of the state as ontological perfection of the person, quoted and
discussed above, renders him a bridge figure in the progression under consideration here.
It took until 1939 and Pius XII’s first encyclical, Summi pontifcatus, for the progression
to reach its new term. There the new Pope described the “civitas,” designed by the
Creator “for the natural perfection of man,”62 as a “quasi instrumentum.” A summary of
the reasons for the emergent clarity of Pius XII on the diminished status of the state
follow immediately, in the next paragraphs of the encyclical: the totalizing state, the state
that takes over private initiatives, the state that forgets or denies that “man and the family
are by nature anterior to the State, and that the Creator has given to both of them powers
and rights and has assigned them a mission and a charge that correspond to their natural
requirements.”63
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The succeeding social encyclicals of Blessed Pope John XXIII and Pope Paul VI
differ from those of the Piuses by virtue of their emphasis on human rights and “social
justice” (broadly understood), but beneath the surface and frequently in the explicit
statements of the texts they remain utterly traditional, discerning ruling power in man’s
natural law participation in the eternal law.64 In the teachings of these two popes, the
state is an instrument called forth and limned by the natural law (and its correlative
natural rights), and the natural law is the human person’s participation in the eternal law.
In Pacem in terris, for example, Pope John XIII writes,

[M]ischief is often caused by erroneous opinions. Many people think that
the laws which govern men’s relations with the State are the same as those
which regulate the blind, elemental forces of the universe. But it is not so;
the laws which govern men are quite different. The Father of the universe
has inscribed them in man’s nature, and that is where we must look for
them; there and nowhere else.

These laws clearly indicate how a man must behave toward his fellows in
society, and how the mutual relationships between the members of a State
and its officials are to be conducted. . . .
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Now the order which prevails in human society is wholly incorporeal in
nature. Its foundation is truth . . . . [S]uch an order – universal, absolute,
and immutable in its principles – finds its source in the true, personal, and
transcendent God. He is the first truth, the sovereign good, and as such
the deepest source from which human society, if it is to be properly
constituted, creative, and worthy of man’s dignity, draws its genuine
vitality. This is what St. Thomas means when he says: “Human reason is
the standard which measures the degree of goodness of the human will,
and as such it derives from the eternal law, which is divine reason . . . .
Hence it is clear that the goodness of the human will depends much more
on the eternal law than on human reason.”

Governmental authority . . . is a postulate of the moral order and derives
from God. Consequently, laws and decrees passed in contravention of the
moral order, and hence of the divine will, can have no binding force in
conscience, since “it is right to obey God rather than men.”

Indeed, the passing of such laws undermines the very nature of authority
and results in shameful abuse. As St. Thomas teaches, “In regard to the
second proposition, we maintain that human law has the rationale of law
in so far as it is in accordance with right reason, and as such it obviously
derives from eternal law. A law which is at variance with reason is to that
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extent unjust and has no longer the rationale of law. It is rather an act of
violence.”65

When we reach the hundredth anniversary of Rerum novarum and Pope John Paul
II’s celebration of it in Centesimus annus, his magna charta on man, state, and society,
we still have an instrumental state, alright, as we have had since Pius XII in 1939. Now,
however, we have one to be wary of. John Paul II wrote disparagingly of “the social
assistance state,” “state administration,” the state as a system of “bureaucratic control,”
and the state as a “secular religion.”66 The reasons for the Polish Pope’s suspicion of the
modern state do not require elaboration. The resulting teaching is clear: The state is an
untrustworthy agent of civil society and particular societies within it. Professor Hittinger
explains: “In contrast to the classical or medieval conception of the civitas, the state in
Centesimus is not the locus or principal expression of cosmic harmony.”67 “[T]here is no
theological mantle draped over the state. Indeed, nowhere in Centesimus can there be
found any reference to the political state’s imaging of divine governance”68 -- a result of
the submersion and disappearance of the natural law, a point to which I shall return.
According to the magisterium of John Paul II, the state is limned by the principle of
subsidiarity, understood as follows, in terms that Taparelli would approve:
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Subsidiarity, understood in the positive sense as economic, institutional or
juridical assistance offered to lesser social entities, entails a corresponding
sense of negative implications that require the State to refrain from
anything that would de facto restrict the existential space of the smaller
essential cells of society. Their initiative, freedom and responsibility must
not be supplanted.69

IV A Prestatement and a Restatement

Before turning to assess the state of Benedict XVI’s state vis-à-vis the classical
state of modern Catholic social doctrine, it will be helpful to have in mind a crisp
statement of the classical, pre-John Paul II Catholic account of man, state, and society. A
statement that is crystal clear and is, moreover, one that more than any other dictated the
direction taken in the social teachings of the Second Vatican Council, is the one
developed by Jacques Maritain (1882-1973), of whom Pope Paul VI was a disciple.
Maritain’s mid-twentieth century account is a remarkable contrast to the state as it has
mutated in the teachings of John Paul II and Benedict XVI.

The reader of the magisterium’s social teaching documents frequently cannot tell
whether any given reference to the state -- usually in Latin “civitas” or “res publica” or
“principatus” or “regnum” or “regimen civile” or the like-- is a reference to the body
politic under the legitimate authority of its leaders or is, rather, a narrower reference to
69
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only those leaders possessed of legitimate authority and organized over a given political
society. That is to say, one cannot tell whether “the state” is a whole, or is only a part.
On this cardinal point, Maritain was singularly clear. According to Maritain, “the basic
political reality is not the state, but the body politic with its multifarious institutions, the
multiples communities which it involves, and the moral community which grows out of
it.”70 “The state,” Maritain continues,

is only that part of the body politic especially concerned with the
maintenance of law, the promotion of the common welfare and public
order, and the administration of public affairs. The State is the part which
specializes in the interests of the whole. It is not a man or a body of men;
it is a set of institutions combined into a topmost machine. . . . The State
is inferior to the body politic as a whole, and is at the service of the body
politic as a whole.71

Maritain refers to his theory of the state as “instrumentalist,”72 because it “regards the
State as a part or an instrument of the body politic.” By insisting that the state is exactly
an instrument or a part of a larger whole, not a whole itself, Maritain assures that the
state cannot claim to be a person -- a group person, that is, a unity of order distinct in
dignity, possessed of its own rights.73 Having surveyed all the temptations to sovereign
and irresponsible statecraft that must be resisted, Maritain concludes that dignity can be
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predicated of the state only in virtue of its succeeding in properly ordering the body
politic of which it is a part:

Then only will the highest functions of the state – to ensure the law and
ensure and facilitate the free development of the body politic – be
restored, and the sense of the State regained by the citizens. Then only
will the State achieve its true dignity, which comes not from power and
prestige, but from the exercise of justice.74

Many of those people who remember and celebrate Maritain’s work do so for its
elaboration of a robust Thomistic account of natural human rights. Whatever one’s
judgment on the bonafides of a Thomistic defense of natural rights, one must remember
what many natural-rights admirers forget, to wit, the following linkage, indeed priority:
The “true philosophy of the rights of the human person is based upon the true idea of
natural law . . . . The same natural law which lays down our most fundamental duties,
and in virtue of which every law is binding, is the very law which assigns us our
fundamental rights.”75 Natural law, along with the derivative natural rights, sets the basic
terms according to which justice is to be done by the state in and for political society, the
justice by which the state earns its dignity. And for Maritain, as for Leo, the natural law
is true law and binding in virtue of the fact that it is not made by human reason, but
promulgated in man, a participation in the eternal law: “Natural Law obliges by virtue of
Eternal Law. It is from the divine reason that it possesses its rational character, and
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consequently, it is from divine reason that it possesses its genuine nature as law and its
obligatory character.”76 Man has been given a share in providential government; all
authority comes from God.

Man’s participation in the divine ruling authority by way of the natural law is in
the background, as it were, counterbalancing or, perhaps better, motivating Maritain’s
instrumentalist theory of the state. Ruling power is transmitted from God through the
people, “from below upwards” (as Maritain says, borrowing a phrase from Pius XII),77
coming to rest from time to time in the state, that part of the united people capable of and
tasked with doing justice, as well as in the plural authorities of diverse societies.
Although Maritain seems, interestingly, never to have used the term subsidiarity, the
political landscape he surveys is one of plural societies respecting and, as necessary,
assisting one another.78 Throughout the social landscape (except that portion which is the
Church), the people through their authoritative representatives have genuine ruling power
from God, and they earn in fact the dignity they have in potency by implementing the
natural law and doing justice. The state is at once servant and participated divine ruler.

It is this latter fact that prevents Maritain from going all the way in the direction
taken by that estimable socialist Harold Laski, who described the state as a “public

76

Jacques Maritain, Natural Law and Moral Law, in MORAL PRINCIPLES OF ACTION 62, 67 (Ruth Nanda
Ashen ed., 1952).
77
JACQUES MARITAIN, INTEGRAL HUMANISM 251 n.10 (1936). This part of the note was added by
Maritain in a revision to Integral Humanism (1936), based on Pius XII’s October 2, 1945, discourse to the
Tribunal of the Sacred Roman Rota.
78
See Patrick McKinley Brennan, Sovereign States? The State of the Question from a Catholic
Perspective, in FAITH AND LAW (Robert Cochran ed., forthcoming 2007).

32

service corporation,” one corporation among many others.79 Maritain notes Laski’s and
his own convergence, “from quite different, even conflicting, lines of thought,” on a
social landscape composed of plural societies, but the different line by which Maritain
gets there assures that a purely workaday image of the instrumental state is not sufficient.
Though less enthusiastically than his contemporaries Heinrich Rommen and Johannes
Messner, Maritain holds that the state is unique among authorities inasmuch as its end is
not a partial good, but instead the common good of political society.80 The Thomistic
idea of a common good is alien to Laski’s cosmos, as is the claim that all authority is by
way of participation in the Eternal Law. The latter delivers an instrumental state that
enjoys the dignity of participated regality. Maritain’s exegesis of Matthew 12:21’s
admonition to render unto Caesar respects the fact that what ruling authority Caesar
enjoys, is from God.81

V. Natural Law: Quo vadis?

For Maritain, along with the rest of the pre-John Paul II Catholic tradition in the
twentieth century, rootedness in and limitation by the natural law (and derivative natural
rights) guaranteed safe passage from a sacred organic state to a more modest,
instrumentalist state. I say pre-John Paul II Catholic tradition because, while no one can
suspect John Paul of being a relativist, Centesimus annus makes absolutely no mention of
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the natural law. John Paul’s encyclical celebrates Rerum novarum without so much as a
mention of the ontologico-legal linchpin of the entire Leonine corpus that the Piuses,
John XXIII, and Paul VI appropriated and refined. Man’s natural law participation in the
eternal law is nowhere to be found in Centesiumus annus.

Admittedly, in the encyclical Veritatis splendor published two years later, in
response to growing sectors of putatively Catholic moral theology and philosophy that
denied that human ethical judgments can be rooted in an objective moral order, and one
that exceeds what is merely “natural,” the natural law figures prominently. The term
“participated theonomy” is used to describe the human person’s access, through reason,
to God’s rational will for his creatures. Though the terminology differs in various ways
from what was traditional82, the central fact is that in the context of moral theology and
philosophy John Paul II was unequivocal that humans are possessed of and measured by
a legal, moral norm from God, even though in treating of the state in Centesimus annus,
John Paul II gives not even glancing attention to the ontologico-legal scaffolding of the
Leonine synthesis.

Of course, inasmuch as every rational human can reach a judgment according to
the natural law for purposes of Veritatis splendor, the Venn diagrams assure that the
subset of humans invested with civil authority are ontologically equipped, if you will, to
reach judgments according to the same natural law (and proceed to give them coercive
effect in the name of the state). Still, John Paul’s silence in Centesimus annus is signal.
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Does Deus caritas echo this silence? As I mentioned in summarizing the
encyclical’s stance on the state, Benedict states that “The Church’s social doctrine argues
on the basis of reason and of the natural law, that is, on the basis of what is in accord with
the nature of the human person and the natural law,” “a ratione et a naturali iure, id est
ab eo quod congruit naturae cuiusque personae humanae.” (28a) This is a statement
about the sources of the Church’s social doctrine on man, society, the state, and so forth.
Is the referenced natural law the one as understood by St. Thomas, Leo, Maritain, et al.?
Does Benedict teach that those possessed of civil authority participate, by way of the
natural law, in the eternal law? It is not clear that he does, for the following reasons, first
from the encyclical itself.

First, Benedict’s distance from the classical thesis on natural law is suggested in
the curious phraseology just quoted: “a ratione et a naturali iure, id est ab eo quod
congruit naturae cuiusque personae humanae.” Does not the Pope thus reduce the
“natural law” to what reason finds congruent with human nature? Recall from my earlier
summary that the Pope answers the question, “What is justice?”, in the following way:
“The problem is one of practical reason.” To which the Thomist-Leonine reply would be,
“Yes, so long as practical reason is understood to be reaching a judgment in accord with a
law that is a participation in the divine governance.”

Second, and relatedly, notice that Benedict’s identifying, as he does in Deus
caritas, justice as “the end and intrinsic criterion” of all politics, is pure Aristotle, lacking
the Thomist overlay – or, rather, scaffolding -- of law, natural and eternal. This
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interpretation of the language of Benedict’s encyclical is fortified by the following
sentence from Cardinal Ratzinger: “Catholic theology has since the later Middle Ages,
with the acceptance of Aristotle and his idea of natural law . . . .”83 The rest of the
sentence that follows the ellipsis does not matter here. Though Aristotle did have a
concept of nature, Aristotle did not have a concept of the natural law or of the eternal
law, nor could he have had, for he lacked the idea of a personal God ruling providentially
and legislatively over his rational creatures.

Benedict’s preference for a non-Thomistic idiom is concessum, as is the propriety
of any pope’s choosing to use non-traditional concepts that are capable of effectively
mediating the (developing) judgments of the magisterial tradition. Since what the Church
asks of the faithful is a religiosum obsequium as to the judgments (not the concepts) of
the teachings, we must ask whether Benedict’s judgment advanced in Deus caritas is that
civil rulers are not capable of taking decisions according to a true law, that is, the natural
law that is not diverse from the eternal law.84

What further light I can shed on this question is derived from several additional
pre-pontificate texts by Joseph Ratzinger, the first dealing at some length with the natural
law itself. In a talk given at the Catholic Academy of Bavaria in January 2004, under the
provocative title, “What Keeps the World Together: The Prepolitical Moral Foundations
of a Free State,” Benedict set as his task to identify “genuinely evidential values – values
sufficiently strong to provide motivation and sufficiently capable of being
83
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implemented.”85 He then offered a brief (and, by his own admission, incomplete) history
of natural law theorizing, mentioning Gratian, Ulpian, Vitoria, Pufendorf, Grotius, and
others, but not Aquinas, and never the eternal law, let alone a doctrine of participation.
Here is Cardinal Ratzinger’s statement, on that occasion, about the status, if you will, of
the natural law:

Natural law has remained – especially in the Catholic Church – one
element in the arsenal of arguments in conversations with secular society
and with other communities of faith, appealing to shared reason in the
attempt to discern the basis of a consensus about ethical principles of law
in a pluralistic, secular society. Unfortunately, this instrument has become
blunt, and that is why I do not wish to employ it to support my arguments
in this discussion. The idea of natural law presupposed a concept of
“nature” in which nature and reason interlock: nature itself is rational.
The victory of the theory of evolution has meant the end of this view of
nature. . . . [The] last surviving element [of the doctrine of natural law] is
human rights. . . . Perhaps the doctrine of human rights ought today to be
complemented by a doctrine of human obligations and human limits.86

What is clear in this text is that in 2004 Cardinal Ratzinger considered “natural law”
unavailing in public discourse, at least ad extra. It remains ambiguous in this text
whether Ratzinger rejects the Thomist thesis on natural (and eternal) law.
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As it did in the entire body of teaching of the Second Vatican Council, democracy
goes unmentioned in Deus caritas. Democracy, however, was a favorite Ratzinger
puzzle. The nerve of the problem, to which the Cardinal returned time and time again, is
that while, on the one hand, democracy has the virtue of allowing all people to participate
in shaping the shared life, on the other hand, democracy as it is practiced seems nearly
universally to deny that there is a good that can be imposed by the leaders to whom the
population has handed over its power (for a term of years).

On the one hand, then, “The

participation of everyone in democracy is the hallmark of freedom. No one is to be
merely the object of rule by others or only a person under control; everyone out to be able
to make a voluntary contribution to the totality of political activity. We can all be free
citizens only if we have a genuine share in decision making. The real goal of
participation in power is thus universal freedom and equality.”87 On the other hand, “the
modern concept of democracy seems indissolubly linked to that of relativism. It is
relativism that appears to be the real guarantee of freedom and especially of the very
heart of human freedom, namely, freedom of religion and of conscience.” Ratzinger
continues immediately: “We would all agree on this today. Yet, if we look more closely,
we are surely obliged to ask: Must there not be a nonrelativistic kernel in democracy
too?” Ratzinger answers his own question as follows: “For is not democracy ultimately
constructed around human rights that are inviolable? Does not democracy appear
necessary precisely in order to guarantee and protect these rights? Human rights are not
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subject to any demand for pluralism and tolerance . . . .”88 But what, Ratzinger goes on
to ask, is the foundation of these?

Here is where things get really interesting, especially as Ratzinger uses Jacques
Maritain to help answer the question. The insight that relativists “make the majority a
kind of divinity against which no further appeal is possible,” Ratzinger reports, “led
Jacques Maritain to develop a political philosophy that attempts to draw on the great
intuitions of the Bible and make those fruitful for political theory.”89 Ratzinger
continues, observing that on Maritain’s view, “Christianity is considered . . . as the source
of knowledge, antecedent to the political action on which it sheds light. . . . The truth
about the good supplied by the Christian tradition becomes an insight of reason and hence
a rational principle. . . . Naturally, this presupposes a certain amount of optimism about
the evidential character of morality and of Christianity.”90 Having surveyed a range of
political theories (including, among the “relativists,” Hans Kelsen and Richard Rorty),
Cardinal Ratzinger concludes: “Maritain[’s] has, [among the theories considered], the
greatest confidence in the rational evidential quality of the moral truth of Christianity and
of the Christian image of God.”91

Maritain’s position on the relationship between natural moral philosophy and
Catholic theology is complex in a way I cannot elaborate here, so I shall simply assert
that Cardinal Ratzinger is right to find in Maritain an ally for the thesis that, as a matter
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of history, Christianity has been necessary for mankind to develop and implement a
practical moral science based on nature and natural law. The light and grace of the
Gospel have illuminated and enlivened what would have remained obscure and largely a
matter of theory (rather than of practice).92 For Maritain, however, the foundation of
morality (and thence of the state) is not just the Christian revelation and theology, but
also natural law (along with natural rights) that is a participation in the eternal law. It is
the rational creature’s being possessed of a genuine law according to which he can make
a judgment that constitutes the basis of politics and positive law – a fact, according to
Maritain, that the Church has helped mankind to discover. For Maritain, rulers not
possessed of a natural law according to which to make legal judgments cannot but make
lawless judgments.93

Against the background developed here, is it not puzzling to read in Deus caritas
that “the formation of just structures . . . belongs to the world of politics, the sphere of the
autonomous use of reason,” “rationis sui ipsius consciae?” This is a juncture at which a
Pope who affirms the existence of a genuine natural law might well have mentioned it.
Yes, politics should be based on “autonomous reason,” but reason reaching judgments
according to a received law – or so the tradition taught.

VI. Lawless Politics?
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We can move toward a conclusion by filling out Benedict’s positive contribution
to our inquiry into the ontological density of the state in modern Catholic social doctrine.
A recurrent thesis in Benedict’s writings is that “the state is not itself the source of truth
and morality,” a nice formulation of the anti-relativist thesis, which he also makes by
saying that the state cannot “produce truth via the majority.”94 With this Ratzinger
combines the thesis that, because freedom for everyone cannot be achieved if the state
does not have “contents” to shape its orderings, “the state must receive from outside itself
the essential measure of knowledge and truth with respect to that which is good.”95 That
“outside,” Ratzinger continues, might ideally be “the pure insight of reason,” but in actual
fact is from “reason that has come to maturity in the historical form of faith,” the Catholic
faith.96 This is the point on which Benedict has an ally in Maritain.

Let us stipulate, first, that Church and state are distinct, and second, that, the
Church has things to teach the state that the state or body politic could not as a matter of
contingent fact discover for itself. In arguing the different point that the state must
receive its contents and direction from “outside” itself (indeed, from the Church, among
others), however, does not Benedict exclude the possibility that qua social creatures
under the natural law, humans themselves are, as they associate and then create and
designate authorities, doing something that is, through participation, proper to them?
Law is not a predicate of the human person, but when humans form societies and create
authorities and institutions that we refer to as “the state,” one necessary source of the
94
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authority of those who rule in political society is the natural law promulgated in their
very selves. It is by virtue of human persons’ participation in the eternal law that they are
potentially legitimate rulers. (They must also be duly designated). Theirs is a state
whose servant ruling-quality enjoys participated regal dignity. Who, then, are these
ruling people Benedict imagines receiving from the Church, but not anchored in the
eternal law? Whence their authority to rule with law?

I mentioned above Pope John Paul II’s inconstancy with respect to the natural law
as between Centesimus annus in 1991 and two years later Veritatis splendor in 1993.
Another two years later, in 1995, John Paul II published Evangelium vitae, and by then
the Pope’s focus, in the encyclical decrying the “culture of death,” was the way in which
the modern state had become the enemy of the human rights on which it, as a condition of
its laicization by the Church, was to be based. The story told in Evangelium vitae is one
of “betrayal,” a word used six times in the document.97 Rejecting the sufficiency of
majority will, the Pope wrote that the values that inform democratic living must respect
the dignity of the human person. He continues: “The basis of these values cannot be
provisional and changeable ‘majority’ opinions, but only the acknowledgment of an
objective moral law which, as the natural law written in the human heart, is the obligatory
point of reference for civil law itself.”98 What the Holy See’s English translation renders
as “natural law” is “moralis lex,” not lex naturalis, but the Pope’s intent is clear.99 John
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Paul also quotes Pacem in terris and even Aquinas himself to the effect that putative law
that violates the natural law which “derives from the eternal law is really no law at all.”100

But was it by then too late to put Humpty Dumpty back together again? Even at
the time of writing Centesimus annus, John Paul felt constrained to acknowledge that
persons who are “convinced that they know the truth and firmly adhere to it are
considered unreliable from a democratic point of view.”101 Is it a surprise that natural
rights disconnected from the natural law wither like cut flowers? John Paul’s ontologicolegal half-way house proved not to be habitable. But what of Benedict’s plainspoken
plea for a non-relativist politics? As John Paul II laying dying, Cardinal Ratzinger told
the Benedictine monks at Subiaco that, affirming as she does that the world comes from
reason, the divine Logos, and is therefore reasonable, the Church, “from the purely
philosophical point of view, [has] really good cards to play.”102 But do these include an
account of a universal moral norm that is a law? This is the question.

Cardinal Ratzinger’s frequent reminders that society must always be in the
process of being built up again, that the state is inevitably a “societas imperfecta,” that
there are limits to what we can achieve in the social order, that mechanisms of social
justice are inherently insufficient, that social charity is among man’s ineliminable needs - these are salutary hedges against utopian overreaching by a self-impressed state,103
against people and supreme courts willing putatively to invest instruments of rule with
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sovereignty and sovereign dignity, and without even glancing attention to a received law
and ruling power. Also welcome is Benedict’s clear insight that both the right sort of
culture and preexisting societies shaped by such culture are necessary to sustain (and
limit) the work of the state. When, however, Cardinal Ratzinger asserts that “the state is
not itself the sacred power but simply an order that finds its limit in a faith that worships,
not the state, but a God who stands over against it and judges it,”104 has not the basis of
authoritative rule been evacuated? While a Cardinal, Ratzinger liked to turn Grotius’s
“etsi Deus non daretur,” even if God did not exist, on its head, asking the non-believer to
take a gamble and act as if God does exist?105 But does this not leave untouched the
question of the legal basis of the state’s authority to make law? God “stands over against
[the state] and judges it,” but on what basis does He judge?106

One can affirm that the Church is sacred in a way that the state, properly
understood, is not, without having to deny that the state is possessed of a share of sacred
ruling authority. If what authority for rule the state possesses is in no way sacred,
however, then it can be no part of the divine ruling power. Do we humans have a selfpossessed power to rule, a rival to the divine? If we have not received a law, then on the
basis of what do we proceed to make law?

In one of my favorite lines of all time,
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Justice Antonin Scalia opined that “God,” not man, “applies the natural law.”107 If that
be true, what, then, do we do? Inasmuch as a devoutly Catholic Justice of the Supreme
Court has consigned us to a fate without benefit of the natural law, the question is not
merely speculative.
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